Biometric Template Privacy Using Visual Cryptography
Résumé
One of the critical steps in designing a secure biometric system is protecting the templates of the users. If a biometric template is compromised, it leads to serious security and privacy threats because unlike passwords, it is not possible for a legitimate user to revoke his biometric identifiers and switch to another set of uncompromised identifiers. This work propose a new cancelable biometric template using visual cryptography (VC) for preserving privacy to biometric data such as finger-vein. The finger vein template is divided into two noisy images, known as shares, using VC, where one share is stored in the system database and the other is kept with the user on a smart card. The private image can be revealed only when both shares are simultaneously available at the same time. The individual share images do not reveal the identity of the private image. We experimentally evaluate performance of the proposed scheme. The evaluation is performed based on the two metrics: (i) False Acceptance Rate (FAR), and (ii) False Rejection Rate (FRR).